arms and equipments. But unless we increase this active army by incorporating into it the troops which arrived in Washington or its neighborhood after the 15th of October, we have only the very moderate force of 52,000 men for our active army in the middle of January. On the first of March, on the other hand, all the troops had been two months in camp, and nearly all had been three months. The whole army was then in admirable condition, well taught, well disciplined, a compact, vigorous, and very formidable force, and ready to take the field.

It seems to us, therefore, that McClellan was perfectly right in deferring active operations on a large scale until the spring, taking into account his estimate of the strength of Johnston's army.[1] But there was no reason why minor movements, such, as attempts to capture the enemy's batteries on the lower Potomac, and to capture Norfolk, should not have been made. The success of the expeditions to the Carolinas would indicate that operations of this character would probably have succeeded.

8. It is quite possible that if McClellan had advanced against Manassas in November or the early part of December, and especially if he had threatened Johnston's communications by a

movement from the mouth of the Occoquan, or from a point in that neighborhood, as President Lincoln suggested, Johnston, knowing his own weakness, would have retired behind the Rappahannock, losing, very likely, in his retreat, both guns and stores. He would also in

i L., *Cl.*, Smith, C. W. P., 40